Contemporary Witness Pößneck-Company – Walpersberg / Mountain Plateau

In the decision by the REIMAHG architect SCHIRRMACHER (referred to in the files cited by LANGE [12]) to lay out the runway for the twin-engine MESSERSCHMITT jet fighters of the Me 262 type produced in the tunnel complex on the plateau of the Walpersberg, the required labor force for this additional rather elaborate construction project was obviously underestimated or the necessary workers could no longer be provided. In the autumn of 1944, the first, albeit not very effective, mass deployments of youths (mainly students) aged between 14 and 16 years took place at REIMAHG. These work deployments with hoes and shovels were subsequently repeated in several waves until the end of the war. Also, the Thuringian Gauleiter SAUCKEL, who regarded the construction of the REIMAHG facility on the Walpersberg as his personal prestige project vis-à-vis the Luftwaffe leadership and the Fighter Staff and pushed it forward with all means at his disposal, was at that time, in his capacity as "General Commissioner for Labor Deployment during Wartime," obviously no longer able to provide labor "at will thanks to his office," as claimed in various publications. It was probably clear to the construction management that the physical work capacity of the youths in the fifth year of the war—also due to nutrition—could not be assessed as very high, but they likely hoped that these mass deployments would at least yield a modest increase in output, for which no other personnel or machine reserves were available. The decision to build the runway on the mountain ridge was made only in August 1944, after all other conceivable possibilities in the immediate vicinity were rejected as even less suitable solely due to topographical conditions. The distance from the plant to the takeoff site on the mountain was, of all other possibly conceivable options, naturally the shortest, which was probably the decisive criterion for this decision, even though this solution also required the construction of a technically complex inclined elevator on the south side of the mountain slope for transporting the aircraft from the plant to the runway. The first aerial photographs by RAF reconnaissance (Royal Air Force) of the Walpersberg from August 15, 1944, show that the clearing of the forest on the west side of the mountain ridge had just begun, clearly visible by the exposed light ground. According to the descriptions of the aerial photo analyst Joan DAVID [1], another suspicious but initially unidentifiable construction project was clearly marked within the extraordinary events on and around the Walpersberg. This aroused the enemy's attention to a special degree, especially since at that time they were particularly searching for objects that might have something to do with the expected rocket offensive. Curiously, the direction of the runway, as it turned out, pointed exactly toward London. The elongated, nearly horizontal ridge of the mountain had to be leveled for the required concreting of the runway over a length of about 1,000 m. For this, proceeding from north to south—that is, across the longitudinal axis of the mountain—a width between about 30 and 40 m had to be removed, from about zero meters in the northeast to approximately 4.5 m at the southern edge (near the upper station of the inclined elevator, where once the highest point of the Walpersberg at 314.5 m above sea level was located). To the east and west, to extend the runway, the loosened rock material was pushed and dumped using the then common standard field railway wagons of about 600 liters capacity, creating heap-like extensions of the plateau in both directions. To compensate for the width, additional excavation material was dumped into the hollows of the south and north slopes as well as into the cuts of old, abandoned factory sandstone quarries. To assist with this task, which had to be accomplished in a short time—it involved the removal of an estimated 75,000 m³ of rock mass in situ (possibly somewhat more), of which about one-third to nearly half had been completed by November 1944—14- to 16-year-old students, i.e., all those not yet in working life or obligated to other war services, were ordered. They were brought daily by train from the immediate and wider surroundings (partly also from Saxony) to the work deployment "runway construction." Since these arrivals and departures initially took place exclusively with the scheduled passenger trains of the DR, this meant, given the wartime low number of trains per day, sometimes long march times, stops at transfer stations (such as in Orlamünde for those from Pößneck or Jena for those from Gera, among others), and additional foot marches to and from there, resulting in a workday of about 14 to 16 hours, which could hardly be described as easy due to the unfamiliar physical exertion and modest nutrition. Regarding the long travel times, for example, the boys from Gera, who were deployed at the same time as those from Pößneck in November, were even more disadvantaged (LICHTWER [13], SEIDEMANN [18]). Later, there were special trains (ENGELHARDT [4]) that ran directly from Pößneck lower station to Kahla and, after the completion of the temporary platforms in Großeutersdorf, also stopped there, from where the path to the plateau and the other main construction sites, especially on the south slope of the mountain, was shortest. The deployments of the youths were organized through the regional leaderships of the HJ and supervised at the workplace by the responsible district leader or his deputy. The Pößneck company (District 218 Rudolstadt) was summoned by an order from the HJ regional leadership Weimar dated October 31, 1944 (Figure 1), which read: "(War deployment of the Hitler Youth on a construction site from November 2 to November 15, 1944)." This first deployment was prematurely terminated after four working days without giving reasons (MÜLLER [15]). It can only be assumed that the work performance with hoes and shovels by the adolescents (mostly without the required physical strength) was so low that the responsible construction manager no longer saw this turmoil of hundreds of youths, with all the additional organizational tasks he still had to manage, in any reasonable proportion to the overall effort.cf. Table 1 from MÜLLER [15]). Furthermore, parents, it was said later, were to have protested to the school principal in Pößneck against these work deployments, mainly due to the lack of suitable or no longer obtainable work clothing (especially good footwear and rain protection) and against the physical labor, which was too heavy for most (HEILIG [7]). Nevertheless, the deployments were periodically continued until the end of the war, for the Pößneckers in February and March 1945. This time, the youths were housed at night in a tunnel in the area of the old, expanded, and developed porcelain sand pit to eliminate the daily time-consuming and exhausting long commutes (ENGELHARDT [4], HETTLER [8], PEITL [16]). Other youths who were obliged to longer deployments lived in one of the barracks camps around Bibra, presumably in the one located in the Zwabitz valley but not yet completed. Couriers entrusted with procuring materials from the factories of the aircraft plant's subcontractors or with similar tasks (mostly one to two years older, exempt from military service) were quartered in a factory building in the town of Kahla, where members of the OT were also housed. They were subordinate directly to the aircraft plant AGO/MESSERSCHMITT on the mountain and possessed special passes (without photo, instead with thumbprint) to pass the tunnel entrances guarded by Flemish SS and to carry out the assigned tasks unhindered on the Reichsbahn, which mainly included supervising the fastest possible transshipment of the transported materials at the transfer stations (LICHTWER [13]). On the first working day in November, the Pößneck company, to which the author belonged, marched in a long column from Kahla station towards the brickyard and from there up the northern slope to the mountain plateau. One saw over what seemed an endless, brightly illuminated leveling of about 15 to 20 meters wide at the time, whose southern embankment, on average about 2.5 to 3 meters high (see above), was being pickaxed by a hardly overlookable crowd of people. The loosened rock masses were loaded with shovels onto narrow-gauge railway wagons and—here in the eastern part of the plain—dumped on a spoil heap protruding considerably from the mountain edge into the Saale valley on the east side, which was already conspicuously visible from afar due to the bright piled rock material. It had become a distinctive feature of the mountain. Near our workplace, on the northern edge of the plateau, stood a cube-shaped structure made of concrete and bricks, 5 meters edge length and about 2 meters high, on top of which a cable deflection pulley about 3/4 meter in diameter was mounted. This block formed the upper structure of a material hoist running on rails, which reached via a straightened strip on the northeast slope to the road that today leads to the northern entrance of the Bundeswehr facility. According to remaining memories, this hoist (brake hill) was not yet in operation in November 1944. At this hoist structure (whose ruin still exists today), we had to assemble on the first working day. There, an officer of an Air Force construction company, apparently the commander on the mountain plateau, gave a speech. He urged us to fulfill our duties conscientiously and stated that this work had to be completed as soon as possible to bring about a turning point in the war fortune by creating a new weapon far superior to the enemies. Our deployment was very significant to achieve this goal; otherwise, terrible things would come upon us all. His only son had fallen in Russia, and for him personally, there was now nothing else but to work here with full force, and we too should give our best for the success of this extraordinarily important project in view of the threatening war situation. Since in early May 1944 the entire construction apparatus of the Air Force had been made available to the OT (Organization Todt) by GÖRING, it can be assumed that our commander also belonged to the OT and was the responsible construction manager for the runway to be built in the officer rank. In our conscription order (MÜLLER [15]) from October 31, 1944, it said under point 3 (cf. Figure 1): Equipment: All participants should, if possible, be equipped with a bread bag and field bottle for taking cold rations as well as washing utensils. In addition, each participant must provide and bring their own work tool, either a spade, shovel, or mattock." After it became apparent that no one had brought the desired work tool, after much back and forth, mattocks and shovels were issued, which stood in large boxes next to a primitive construction hut nailed together from boards (which was obviously the "office" of the construction manager), located on the path laid over the east slope towards the military road. They were collected and locked up again after the end of work. Our first task was to scrape the humus remaining on the north slope just below the lateral embankments further downhill, which proved practically impossible due to the dense, fine root system between the remaining tree stumps and was probably also completely unnecessary. This strange work was abandoned, and we were assigned to the huge anthill of those hacking and shoveling engaged in the leveling work, so we then stood on all further working days alongside a large number of Italian prisoners of war ("Badoglios") in their greenish uniforms. The loaded wagons were mostly pushed off with loud shouting from those involved, then jumped on, and with varying success, attempts were made to roll along to the tipping point because an existing narrow-gauge diesel locomotive often did not work or was running somewhere in the western part of the plain. Frequent derailments of the wagons on the rails, which were only provisionally laid due to the often necessary backs, were the inevitable consequence, whereby re-levering the loaded, heavy wagons using a loading lever each time was done under widely audible shouting.According to the author's recollections, at the beginning of November there was only one excavator at the wall to be excavated, approximately in the middle of the plateau, which had been transported by unknown means, possibly in parts, over the narrow forest path running up the north slope. MEYER [14] notes on this question in his report: "True monsters of excavators were used for this. Getting them up to the mountain height already cost great effort, but getting them down was even more difficult." Elsewhere, MEYER states that a total of 23 large excavators were in use at Walpersberg, so it can be considered certain that after our deployment in November, further equipment was brought up to the mountain plateau. In our work area, a few Russian prisoners of war were still handling tasks, including sharpening a large number of smaller stakes, which were probably needed for marking out. They also occasionally carried a sack of cement on a stretcher between two of them from the Heerweg over the mentioned footpath to the plateau for some work sites not visible to us, which probably involved the construction of the upper abutment and the machine chamber for the aircraft inclined elevator at the southern edge of the plateau. This type of cement transport also indicates that the mentioned material lift on the north slope was not yet completed at the time of our first deployment in early November. The concreting of the runway began later, with the cement and gravel, or the ready-mixed concrete, then mostly brought up with this lift (CIOS [3]). Overall, during our November deployment, an estimated 800 people were engaged daily in the removal and leveling work on the mountain ridge. Subjectively, these works progressed only slowly. The material to be removed consisted of old glacial Saale gravel, more or less strongly cemented by sandy material, which formed a cap covering the entire mountain ridge, probably along the entire length of the mountain, down to the underlying approximately 10 m thick sandstone layer, which in some quarries both on the north and south slopes just below the plateau edge was formerly widely used as building stone. To the west, these layers dip gently (about 10 m over 1,000 m), so the runway built on them—viewed towards the west—sloped slightly downward. The runway, mainly due to this geological condition, therefore did not have a truly horizontal position in its finished state. In places where the subsoil had to be compacted, a heavy tamping ram, usually operated by an Italian (then quite common), was used, guided by a control handle. This worked during our working days in November with its distinctive noise in the middle and western parts of the leveling area (SEIDEMANN [18]). In areas where the gravel to be removed was too hard and cemented, it was blasted. The drill holes were made with a small vertical drilling machine, as used for trimming in quarries. The blasting and taking cover was each time an experience and a welcome break from work. Part of the extracted gravel was probably sieved and reserved for the later concreting of the runway. How many cubic meters of the gravel masses were removed daily or per man and day is not known and very difficult to reconstruct. The achieved performances can only be roughly estimated: An assumed total removal of about 75,000 m³ in situ over a period of about six months would correspond to an average performance (including Sundays) of about 420 m³ per day, with 800 workers about 1/2 cubic meter per man, which would be an extraordinarily low performance for reasonably hackable rock, at which no one could have collapsed in an 8-hour day. Moreover, the performances of the excavators would have to be deducted, which according to the machine standards of the time could have been estimated at about 25 m³ per effective operating hour and machine. Therefore, it is difficult to follow the statements of Lange [12], who, citing a record by F. STEMLER, a Polish forced laborer of REIMARG, quotes the achieved performances with the following words: "Normally, 7 hours are calculated for the excavation of one cubic meter of earth; here, 27.5 hours had to be calculated." Where STEMLER got these figures from is uncertain, as is what exactly he means by "earth," especially since this term primarily refers to loose material and whether he was referring to the fundamentally very different underground or aboveground performances, etc. According to the standard textbook of mining by HEISE-HERBST-FRITZSCHE (10th edition 1962, p. 6), in the chapter "Prospecting trenches, prospecting tunnels and shafts": "The costs of prospecting trenches made with pick and shovel can be calculated on the basis of an average performance of 4 m³ per man per shift." [Author's note: Of course, for a fully capable worker and where a shift can hardly be counted as more than 7 hours of effective working time]. From this, under normal working conditions and for rock that can be loosened with pick and shovel, Lange [12] derives 7 working hours per cubic meter, i.e., about 4.3 times the time expenditure, which remains unknown. Moreover, according to STEMLER's data, the excavation of one cubic meter at REIMARG was calculated not only with 7 but with 27.5 hours, i.e., about 16.5 times longer than the above-mentioned standard value from mining. According to STEMLER's calculation, the leveling work for the estimated 75,000 m³ would have required 2,062,500 working hours, which could only have been completed by 800 workers constantly available in 368 working days (at 7 effective working hours per man and day).The fact, however, is that the entire leveling work, including the concreting of the runway itself, measuring 1,000 m in length, 30 m in width, and approximately 30 cm in thickness, was completed, except for minor remaining tasks, by mid-February 1945, i.e., quite exactly after half a year of working time. The work performance, or the number of workers employed on average, must have been different, or quite varied, especially considering the large excavator work that still needs to be deducted here, certainly different from those cited by LANGE. In a two-shift operation, if such was in place, i.e., with 2 x 800 workers and 7 effective working hours per shift, about half a year of construction time would be calculated, but again the excavator work would have to be taken into account regarding the performance per man and shift. Shortly after our arrival on the mountain, we became acquainted with a condition that was as highly unpleasant as it was incomprehensible, which lasted throughout the entire construction period, i.e., until mid-April 1945, remained unforgettable for all involved there, and ultimately contributed to severe health impairments, namely various epidemic diseases, indiscriminately affecting all present: On the first working day, which was cool and slightly rainy, we wanted to build a hut in the forest on the northern slope from the numerous cut-off pine branches of the cleared trees to store our clothing and bread bags. But wherever one stepped on the mountainside, one stepped into human excrement, in a number that was simply unimaginable, and accordingly, the stench constantly wafted through the pine forest and, according to several reports, persisted unbroken until the end of the war. This fact, which can only be cautiously described as an absolutely irresponsible negligence, was completely incomprehensible insofar as it would have been possible with simple measures to enforce the necessary cleanliness by order if necessary. Why the construction management watched this ongoing contamination completely passively without apparently considering that the spread of epidemics would have been more likely to paralyze the entire construction operation than an aerial bombardment remains unfathomable. Possibly, the responsible parties had already realized that it was "too late" for this project anyway, and so they simply let the reins slacken, even at the risk of considerable personal infection. At least our responsible camp leader tried to bring a bit more order to this incomprehensible condition in a daily order issued for the second working day on Friday, November 3, 1944, addressed to his subordinate Pößneck boys (MÜLLER [15]). Point 5 of his written order therefore read (see Figure 2): "Each company leader shall ensure the establishment of a makeshift latrine facility during the course of November 3, 1944. The location of the same is to be communicated to the boys. It must be ensured that the forest is not contaminated and that other workers present at the construction site do not use them." Our latrine was then built in the pine forest on the northern slope, about 80 m downhill from the plateau edge, slightly west of the material lift. Once completed, it was immediately frequented by the Italian prisoners of war. Subsequently, the painstakingly constructed facility was no longer used by us out of fear of any contagious diseases. The urgently needed and requested bleaching powder was also not delivered, so the previous condition remained. Gradually, as a result of these conditions violating all minimal hygienic requirements in the gathering of large groups of people (accelerated by the cold winter months and the increasingly worsening nutritional situation), almost as expected, more and more epidemic intestinal diseases appeared, including typhus, which in March also led to a considerable number of sick people, discharges home, or quarantine among the youths housed in the camps near Bibra. Particularly among the foreign workers, a highly concerning level of illness with numerous deaths was noted in March (LANGE [11]). By the end of March, more or less all those working at or on the Walpersberg were affected by these epidemics or confronted with these infectious diseases in one way or another. For the treatment of injuries occurring during work, the medical station near the barbed-wire fenced barracks camp for the Italian prisoners of war located on the northeast slope was responsible for the youths. The doctor on duty there was also Italian. In the barracks, there were a number of beds covered with white linen, which stood in remarkable contrast to the rest of the dirt on the mountain (ENGELHARDT [4]). Just below our work site, on a clearing on the southern slope, stood a new, constantly locked, solid, partially basemented blockhouse, about whose significance much speculation was made. Rumors declared that it belonged to Reichsmarschall GÖRING, the supreme commander of the Luftwaffe, who had visited the REIMAHG with leading figures of the Jägerstab on October 10, 1944, shortly before our deployment. However, the newly erected house was part of the facility and served Gauleiter SAUCKEL, the all-powerful builder, as quarters or office during his visits. During our stay in November, however, no one appeared in this blockhouse. There were no prominent visitors who wanted to inform themselves about our work results. Normally, we reached the construction site from Pößneck around half past seven, at a time that could not always be precisely maintained due to trains no longer running punctually. One day, due to a train cancellation, we had to march from Orlamünde station to the mountain and thus arrived correspondingly late (distance about 3.2 km to the plateau). Official work ended at 4:30 p.m. Afterwards, usually amid not too quiet shouting, groups without marching order went to Kahler station, where there was again a large gathering of boys with corresponding noise before the expected trains finally rolled in and were "stormed" by huge masses, contrary to all orders, amid shouting. The daily order (Figure 2) from November 3, 1944, therefore notes not without reason under point 12: "At the station, the boarding of the trains is carried out with the greatest discipline. The company leaders are responsible."When finally the hometown Pößneck was reached, the time was more or less always uncertain. One evening, for example, due to endless train delays and to avoid the exhausting wait at the transfer station Orlamünde, we continued in the dark all the way to Langenorla, where the train finally caught up with us. "Breakfast time" was from 9:30 to 9:50, lunch break from 13:00 to 14:00. A farmer brought the food buckets on a straw-covered cart (horse-drawn) to the construction site, from which the same food was served to everyone, mostly a kind of potato soup, sometimes with a few small pieces of meat. Those who were not better off nutritionally at home through an agricultural operation or similar, i.e., were exclusively dependent on their food ration cards, experienced physical exertion accompanied by hunger, which is why lunch was gladly accepted. The claim that the food was poured into the sand because it was inedible (as described by another participant and cited by LANGE [12]) could neither the author nor those he interviewed ever observe. It was probably an exceptional case. LICHTWER [13], during his longer assignments, described the "warm meals" (mostly cabbage soups) as "neither good nor bad," and the evening cold meals were "very decent" according to the nutritional conditions of the time. According to the memories of witnesses who were ordered to another work assignment in February 1945, the same food was also distributed to the Italians*), indeed to everyone involved in the runway construction, where the teams had to squeeze through a narrowing, cattle-pen-like slatted construction**) to the distribution point, where SA men "from SAUCKEL's guard" (LANGE [11]) supervised***) and were petty, among other things, about the correct position of the HJ armband and acted wildly if it shifted in the crowd (HÜTTNER [9]). *) Other reports indicate that the Italians prepared their meals in their own kitchen and even received white bread compared to others. The French are also said to have operated their own kitchen. Possibly, only those working on the mountain plateau received a uniform supply of warm meals due to their large number. **) According to personal memories, such a slatted construction for food distribution did not exist in November, and at that time there were no SA men as supervisors on the mountain plateau. In February, according to ENGELHARDT [4], apparently due to the presence of forced laborers, guards with dogs were on the mountain plateau. In case of air raid alarm, the construction site, which was clearly visible from the air, had to be evacuated. Certain tunnels of the facility, located about 80 m below the level of the mountain plateau, were designated as shelters. Ours was in an access on the north slope, right among the trees (pines), and at that time still had no lateral access road. Presumably, this opening is now the northern main portal to the Bundeswehr facility. Upon our arrival there, we always found two strong Ukrainian women (obviously well nourished) who transported sand from the tunnel on one of the standard field railway carts and dumped it directly in front of the portal. Compared to their strong figures, most of us appeared physically quite "scrawny." The tunnel here was not very long and probably still ended blindly in the mountain at that time. Electric lamps hanging from the elms (light bulbs with flat, enameled lampshades) moderately illuminated the rooms. A branch turning slightly southward to the right, heading west, which ended after about 30 m, was our air-raid shelter, which was not yet developed, i.e., not lined with shotcrete or concreted at the base. It stood raw in the yellowish to light brown sandstone mountain, which subjectively appeared quite solid. When the heavy anti-aircraft batteries in Jena fired, however, the sandy loose material trickled down from the ridge and joints, making the underground stays somewhat uncomfortable. The typical smell of explosive gases always permeated the tunnel. Otherwise, to our regret, nothing moved in this area of the mysterious underground world, as we wanted to know out of curiosity and interest what exactly was happening in this mountain. We, merely "auxiliary workers" assigned to shoveling during the runway construction, learned nothing concrete about the underground facility and could only orient ourselves poorly on the circulating rumors, which usually only partially corresponded to the facts. With the appearance of such large masses of youths, it was inevitable that all sorts of feats of strength were provoked out of mischief, which also arose quite naturally from the liberating feeling of having escaped school. From these new living conditions, one day a duel with small lumps of clay developed with the "Badoglios," which an older Italian quickly ended with his energetic appearance (HEILIG [7]). Yelling and shouting, even for trivial reasons, were almost to be expected and accompanied the entire monotonous daily routine. The city building master of Kahla, Albert MEYER [14], also recalls in his record about "Kahla and the REIMAHG facility" regarding the runway construction on the mountain as follows: "Jena schoolboys were also employed in its construction, whose most outstanding feature was probably the dreadful noise they made up there. It could be heard over in Lindig*)." *) Distance measured in a straight line: 3 km. There were also reprimands from the construction supervisors for improper behavior or, for example, for wearing unwanted headgear, which was justified by the lack of other suitable work clothing. Such clothing was hardly available in the 6th year of the war, especially no weatherproof garments and the urgently needed sturdy footwear. As compensation for clothing wear, each person was supposed to receive 1 Reichsmark per day of deployment (see Figure 1, point 6), which, as far as remembered, never happened in our case. According to point 2 of the call-up order (and also strictly controlled), it was ordered to wear the HJ armband to make us identifiable in the confusing crowd of peoples on the mountain. This armband, worn on the left sleeve, gave us free passage through the platform barriers at the train stations, which awakened in us a completely new "sovereign" feeling compared to the previously accustomed school compulsion, especially with regard to the otherwise meticulously exact ticket inspections, which were still carried out with great thoroughness at all stations at that time. A certain novel freedom was thus surprisingly created, which—for others also clearly and disturbingly audible—was filled with youthful shouting and racket. Guard teams for the Italian prisoners of war—for whom our identification with the swastika armband might have been of greater importance (see above)—were not seen on the mountain ridge, at least on the days of our presence in November. Also, the entire area at the foot of the mountain was not cordoned off. Therefore, at least on the east and north slopes, all paths to the mountain plateau could be passed uncontrolled. Any observations of harassment or brutal acts against prisoners of war or the many foreign and forced laborers employed, as are repeatedly generalized in certain publications over decades, could not be observed during our deployment days. The pickaxing and shoveling flowed in a more or less casual, self-regulating, sluggish rhythm. It is remembered that the Italians repeatedly tried to light open fires on the cool days, from wet wood, tar residues, and other scattered materials, causing clear smoke plumes to rise each time. This prompted the Air Force construction manager to run over shouting and threatening, to strike the fire pit with a shovel and then trample out the smoke source with his boots. This action was justified due to suspicion of deliberate "smoke signals," especially since enemy aircraft were almost constantly somewhere in the sky during this time of the war, and because of mostly single-flying reconnaissance planes, no air raid alarms had been given for some time (at most the so-called "pre-alarm," during which work had to continue). Making fires on the construction site was therefore forbidden. This order had certainly also reached the Italians; nevertheless, they resisted and thus repeatedly inevitably challenged the supervising persons. Regarding the matter of the mentioned furious behavior of the construction manager against the repeated forbidden fire-making by the Italians, reference is made to a depiction by LANGE [121], who, referring to a newspaper article by M. THIELE in "Das VOLK" (Organ of the District Leadership Erfurt of the SED from 3.2.65), writes: "During the work on the concrete runway, the German work supervisor beat a foreign worker to death. Cursing, he stepped on the lifeless body until the corpse was carried aside by two others." Two questions seem appropriate regarding this depiction: a) whether the construction manager (if it was ours) lost his nerves because of these constant repetitions of fire-making, or b) whether the possibly not properly observed event from a distance was rather the fire extinguishing practiced by the cited work supervisor with the shovel and by trampling out? The 9th company from Pößneck, with a nominal strength of 103 men, could have provided 412 man-shifts during the deployment days from 2 to 7 November 1944 at 100% readiness, but only 334 were achieved, i.e., 81% (see Table 1, MÜLLER [151]). The nominal strength decreased further from workday to workday. The declining work readiness was partly due to the bad weather. Similar force ratios were probably present in the companies from other locations as well. Another deployment period for the Pößneckers was from 6 February to 9 March 1945, i.e., six weeks long*), during which accommodation was in the factory tunnels and partly also in the newly built but not yet fully completed residential camp in the Zwabitztal near Bibra. The camp could allegedly accommodate 1,000 residents. (Probably together with the camp in the Schindlertal, both of which were later to serve the accommodation of staff members of the aircraft factory). *) The author did not participate in this deployment, as he had meanwhile been conscripted into the Torpedo Arsenal Mitte, Rudolstadt. The information given here is essentially based on the oral and written statements of his classmates and others who were ordered back to Walpersberg during this time. Also, the female students of the same age and somewhat older were committed in larger numbers to work at REIMARG in February. Their task was to support the deployment of the boys, i.e., to maintain the residential barracks and help in kitchen service (CEBULLA [2], PEITL [16]). During this deployment, according to HETTLER [8], they experienced the start of the first Me 262 jet fighter from REIMARG production on 21 February 1945 at 13:35. According to CEBULLA [2] and GÜGOLD [5], a war-disabled, leg-amputated Luftwaffe pilot repeatedly appeared on a motorcycle to pick up the aircraft. According to rumors circulating at the time, it could not be clearly concluded that the aircraft were flown exclusively to Zerbst for test flights and further equipment (see among others RADINGER, SCHICK [17] and JURLEIT [10]). It was claimed, among other things, that the aircraft were also transferred to Erfurt airport, which, however, did not correspond to the facts. The camps near Bibra were not yet completed (two-story stone barracks), and among other things, the installation of water was lacking, so water had to be carried in buckets from the taps in front of the barracks. Here too, poor hygiene was the special characteristic: the toilet facilities were very primitive and outside the buildings. Straw sacks and wool blankets were used for sleeping. The rooms were furnished with simple wooden furniture (usually with bunk beds, lockers, tables, and chairs) and heated with iron "cannon stoves," on which not only wet clothes were dried but also the drinking water was heated and the dry army bread toasted due to lack of spread.was. The camp was still in the midst of mud and dirt (Figure 4), there were still no paved paths between the barracks, which made the lack of sturdy footwear particularly unpleasant for most of the youths here as well. This second youth deployment was discontinued in early/mid-March due to the increasingly epidemic spread of intestinal diseases and the outbreak of typhus (CEBULLA[2], ENGELHARDT[4], HADRICH[6], PEITL[16]). Some of the boys living in the camps around Bibra in February/March 1945 were also used for courier services and other lighter work on the construction site (HÄDRICH [6]). However, most were still shoveling on the taxiway, a shoveling that—seemingly—would never end, even though by mid-February the concreting of the runway was practically completed and only finishing work remained. Some of the rock masses to be removed still stand today as an embankment on the southern edge of the plateau. They were probably intended to remain there as a strategic reserve, to have material available for refilling craters in the event of bomb explosions on the runway. As far as the youths could not be accommodated in the camps around Bibra, they slept in a blind tunnel in the area of the former and now expanded and developed porcelain sand pit under the southeast slope of the mountain. This had a concrete floor and was whitewashed. It was equipped with electric heating tubes running along the joints (elms). They slept on straw, in two rows with their feet toward the center of the tunnel, each with three blankets. From time to time, a security patrol with long iron rods roamed the entire tunnel system, tapping the ridges and joints to locate and remove any loose rock, which gradually gave the whitewashed walls a mottled appearance. Here in this underground night camp there was the great advantage of using a new, spacious sanitary room tiled in reddish-brown up to head height, which, after the previously miserable experiences at REIMAHG in this regard, caused almost incredulous astonishment. This facility belonged to the installations of the aircraft factory. In the middle of the room stood a row of double-sided washbasins with running water, and toilets were installed along the walls on the sides (ENGELHARDT [4]). The sanitary room was only allowed to be used in groups, as it was difficult for the uninitiated to find in the extensive, labyrinth-like irregular tunnel system of the old mine area (with partly very narrow entrances and passages), and thus no one could attempt alone to make private excursions, for example into the factory tunnels, which naturally were the focus of all understandable curiosity and into which one could catch fleeting glimpses from certain points on the way to the sleeping tunnel. In them, the machine and lathes were arranged in a herringbone pattern (ENGELHARDT [4]). In the sleeping tunnel, the warm meals served in porcelain bowls, which were delivered in milk cans, were also eaten. A disadvantage of the underground dwelling in the evening was the complete isolation from the outside world and all sources of news, especially since walking around in the tunnels and thus the possibility of learning something new was forbidden. Besides the special advantage of using the new, exemplary sanitary room, there was the sensitive disadvantage to endure that in the sleeping tunnel, due to lack of appropriate installations, the lighting could not be turned off during the night (ENGELHARDT [4]).